



Abstract: In “On Oppy’s Objections to the Modal Perfection Argument,”
Philo 8, 2, 2005, 123–30, Robert Maydole argues that his modal perfection
argument—set out in his “The Modal Perfection Argument for a Supreme
Being,” Philo 6, 2, 2003, 299–313—“remains arguably sound” in the face of
the criticisms that I made of this argument in my “Maydole’s 2QS5
Argument,” Philo 7, 2, 2004, 203–11. I reply that Maydole is wrong: his
argument is fatally flawed, and his attempts to avoid the criticisms that I
have made of his argument are to no avail.
Maydole claims that the following argument—or, at any rate, a more sophis-
ticated version of this argument, the further complexities of which will not
be relevant to the following discussion—is sound:
M1: A property is a perfection only if its negation is not a perfection
M2: Perfections entail only perfections.
M3: Supremity is a perfection.
(Therefore) A supreme being exists.
In this argument, perfections are taken to be properties that “it is better to
have than not to have”; and supremity is the property of being greater than
any other possible being.
1.
The main objection that I lodged against Maydole’s modal perfection argu-
ment is that it is obvious that M2 is false. Suppose, for the sake of argument
that M3 is true; i.e. suppose that supremity is a perfection. Then, by M2, the
property of being either supreme or else a mass murderer is a perfection. But—as
the cases of Hitler and Stalin make clear—it is evident that the property of
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being either supreme or else a mass murderer is not a property that it is better to
have than not to have: it would have been much better than not had Hitler
and Stalin both lacked this property. Hence it is not true that perfections
entail only perfections, at least granted that supremity is a perfection.
In response to this objection, Maydole (2005:124f.) writes:
How then does Oppy support the claim that the property of being either
supreme or else a mass murderer is not a perfection? His argument seems to
be this:
1. If the property of being supreme or else a mass murderer were a
perfection, then it would be better for Hitler and Stalin to have
it than not.
2. It would be better for Hitler and Stalin to lack the property of
being supreme or else a mass murderer than it is for them to pos-
sess this property.
3. (Therefore) The property of being supreme or else a mass mur-
derer is not a perfection.
Why would it be better than not for Hitler and Stalin to lack the property
of being supreme or else a mass murderer? Oppy never tells us, appealing
only to what is he says clear and intuitive.
I disagree. While it would have been far better than not had Stalin and
Hitler lacked the property of being a mass murderer, and while the property
of being a mass murderer does entail the property of being supreme or else a mass
murderer, it does not thereby follow that it would have been far better than
not had Stalin and Hitler lacked the property of being supreme or else a mass
murderer. It would also have to be assumed that properties entailed by prop-
erties  that it is better to lack than not are themselves properties that it is
better to lack than not. But that assumption is false. Many of the necessary
conditions of properties that it is better to lack than not are either neutral
or better to have than not.
I agree with Maydole that it is not true that properties entailed by proper-
ties  that it is better to lack than not are necessarily themselves properties
that it is better to lack than not. However, I disagree with his suggestion that
one needs this assumption in order to defend the claim that the property of
being either supreme or else a mass murderer is not a property that it is better to
possess than not.
Let’s begin with a warm-up exercise. Suppose we grant to Maydole—as
I have already implicitly done, at least for the sake of the present discus-
sion—that we can sort properties into three mutually exclusive classes:
those that it is better to have than not to have, those that it is worse to have
than not to have, and those that are neither better to have than not to have
nor worse to have than not to have. (I take it that it is indeed obvious that
it cannot be true of a single property that it is both better to have than not
to have, and worse to have than not to have.) Now, suppose that B is one of
the properties that it is better to have than not to have, and that W is one of
the properties that it is worse to have than not to have. How should we clas-
sify the property B or W? I take it that symmetry considerations alone sug-
gest that this can only be a property that it is neither better to have than not
to have nor worse to have than not to have. But, of course, the point of my
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chosen example is that, while supremity belongs to the same class as B, being
a mass murderer belongs to the same class as W; whence it surely follows that
being either supreme or else a mass murderer is neither better to have than not to
have nor worse to have than not to have.
If this argument is not found totally persuasive, there is another feature
of the chosen example to which appeal can also be made. I take it that it is
highly plausible to claim that it is simply impossible for any human being to
possess the property of supremity. Hence, in particular, it is impossible for
either Hitler or Stalin to possess the property of supremity, simply because of
the fact that they are human beings. But, if that’s right, then what sense are
we to make of the claim that it is better than not for either of them to possess
the property of being either supreme or else a mass murderer? They are the kinds
of things that can only possess the property of being either supreme or else a
mass murderer by being mass murderers. How, then, can it be better than not
that they possess this disjunctive property?
Even if it is denied that it is impossible for either Hitler or Stalin to pos-
sess the property of supremity, it seems that one can also point out that dis-
junctive properties such as the property of being either supreme or else a
mass murderer are bound to be “supervenient”. That is: any being that pos-
sesses a disjunctive property of this kind does so only because it possesses
one of the disjoined properties. In particular, in the case of Hitler or Stalin,
he only possesses the property of being either supreme or else a mass murderer
because he possesses the property of being a mass murderer. The relevant con-
sideration is thus not that the property of being a mass murderer entails the
property of being either supreme or else a mass murderer; rather, the relevant
consideration is that, in many cases the property of being either supreme or else
a mass murderer is only possessed or instantiated because the property of
being a mass murderer is possessed or instantiated. In those cases, it is very hard
to believe that it is better than not that the property of being either supreme or
else a mass murderer is possessed or instantiated.
It may help to fix ideas to consider a different case. Suppose that—at
least for the sake of argument—we grant that it is better than not to be wise,
and that it is worse than not to be cowardly. How should we think about the
property of being either wise or cowardly? At least prima facie, it seems plausi-
ble to say the following. It is better than not to be either wise or cowardly just
in case one is wise and not cowardly; it is worse than not to be either wise or
cowardly just in case one is cowardly and not wise; and it is hard to know
what to say in the case that one is both wise and cowardly. If this is right,
then it seems to me that the plausible conclusion to draw is that, sans phrase,
the property of being either wise or cowardly is neither better to have than not
to have, nor worse to have than not to have. Of course, I am not here sup-
posing that a property is better to have than not to have only if it is neces-
sarily true that, in every case, it is better that the property is instantiated
than not instantiated. It might be—for example—that the property of being
intelligent is better to have than not to have, even though there are cases in
which it is not better that the property is instantiated than not instantiated,
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as, for example, in cases of extremely cruel and vindictive people. We do
have an intuitive sense that some properties are virtues, even though there
are cases in which the exemplification of a virtue makes matters worse
rather than better. But, whereas intelligence is a plausible candidate for being
a virtue, the property of being either wise or cowardly is not a plausible such
candidate. (Plainly, some might be drawn to the conclusion that the case of
intelligence shows that there are no—or very few—properties that are, sans
phrase, better to have than not to have. If we go in this direction—perhaps
even going so far as to question the intelligibility of the suggestion that there
are properties that are, sans phrase, better to have than not to have—then,
at the very least, we shall be drawn to the conclusion that intelligence is not
a property that it is better to have than not to have. As we shall go on to
note, this line of reasoning has interesting consequences for discussion of the
claim that the set of properties that it is worse to have than not is closed
under logical entailment.)
Before I close this section, let me try one more case. Consider the prop-
erty of being either slovenly or slothful or jealous or murderous or cowardly or stu-
pid or venal or just. (Strictly, this formulation can be taken to do duty for a far
more complex disjunctive property in which each of the properties that it is
worse to possess than not is a disjunct, and in which the property of being
just is the sole further disjunct.) Maydole would say that it is obvious that,
sans phrase, it is better than not to possess this property (because this prop-
erty is entailed by justice, justice is one of the properties that, sans phrase, it
is better to possess than not, and the set of properties that, sans phrase, it is
better to possess than not is closed under logical entailment). I do not think
that I will be alone in finding this claim to be a tiny bit implausible.
2.
There are a number of other issues that Maydole takes up in his paper, and
upon which I would like to make some comments. The first issue concerns
parodies of Maydole’s argument that seek to establish the existence of a
most imperfect being.
Maydole begins by objecting to the following argument:
N1: A property is an imperfection only if its negation is not an
imperfection.
N2: Imperfections entail only imperfections.
N3: Being paltry is an imperfection
(Therefore) A paltry being exists
Taking it that a property is an imperfection if and only if it is not a perfec-
tion, Maydole (2003) points out that N1 is plainly false under this assump-
tion, since there are properties that are neither perfections nor imperfec-
tions, and whose negations are neither perfections nor imperfections. In
response, I pointed out that this particular objection fails if we suppose that
imperfections are properties that it is worse to have than not to have.
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Contra Maydole (2005), I did not suggest that the parody is successful under
this interpretation. It is obvious that, if I suppose that the property of being
either supreme or else a mass murderer refutes M2, then I will suppose that that
property will also refute N2 under this revised interpretation. My point was
merely that there is a straightforward amendment to the above argument
that evades the only objection that Maydole (2003) made against it.
Maydole (2005) makes a different objection to the argument on the
revised interpretation. He says that, while some might suppose that the
property of being a McCarthyist is an imperfection, that property entails the
perfection of being intelligent. Setting aside the question whether the fact that
some people might suppose that the property of being a McCarthyist is an
imperfection provides any reason at all to suppose that the property of being
a McCarthyist actually is an imperfection, the obvious point to make here is
that there is a line of thought—noted at the end of the previous section—
that would cast doubt on the idea that the property of being intelligent is itself
a perfection. If perfections must be such that it is necessarily true that, in
every case, it is better that the property is instantiated than not instantiated,
then—as the example in question can be taken to make clear—it simply isn’t
true that intelligence is a perfection. (Of course, so long as we grant that
there are some cases of perfections and imperfections, the kind of objection
that I made in section 1 above will continue to suffice to refute both M2 and
N2. But it is not at all clear that, on the line of thought under consideration,
we now have reason to say that the parody involving imperfection is notably
worse than the argument that Maydole wishes to defend.)
Of course, it is worth pointing out that, since Maydole’s argument has
an evidently false premise, the question of whether that argument is sus-
ceptible of parody is of merely academic interest. In the case of Anselm’s
ontological argument, it is a live and interesting question whether it is sus-
ceptible of parody in the style of Gaunilo precisely because it is very difficult
to make a decisive assessment of the exact failing—if there is one—that is to
be found in Anselm’s argument. A similar point applies to Gödel’s ontolog-
ical argument: it is a live and interesting question whether that argument is
susceptible of parody precisely because it is no straightforward matter to
make a decisive assessment of the exact failing—if there is one—that is to be
found in that argument. (In Anselm’s argument, it is also true that it is quite
unclear exactly how the argument is best understood. That provides an
additional reason for interest in parody, since we can match text to text
without worrying about the details of formalization. Of course, this further
consideration does not apply in the case of Maydole’s argument.)
3.
Maydole (2005) also provides a critique of my attempt to show that there are
successful parodies of Gödel’s ontological argument.
For the purposes of this discussion, roughly following Maydole’s lead,
we may suppose that Gödel’s ontological argument runs as follows:
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A1: A property is positive only if its negation is not positive.
A2: Positive properties entail only positive properties.
A3: The property of being God-like—i.e. the property of possessing
all the positive properties—is positive.
A4: Positive properties are necessarily positive.
A5: Necessary existence is a positive property.
(Therefore, there exists a being whose essential properties are all
and only the God-like properties.)
Here, we only roughly follow Maydole’s lead, because Maydole suggests that
the property of being God-like is the property of possessing all and only the
positive properties, and takes the conclusion of the argument to be the claim
that there exists a God-like being. But this formulation does not do justice
either to Gödel’s argument or to intuition, since it seems pretty clear that
there are many properties for which it is true that neither those properties
nor their negations are positive, even though it must be true in each case that
either the property or its negation is possessed by a God-like being. (Consider,
for example, the property of weighing at least two kilograms. It is hard to see
any reason to suppose either that the property of weighing at least two kilograms
is positive or that the property of not weighing at least two kilograms is positive.
Certainly, neither of these properties is “simple and absolute,”nor “moral/aes-
thetic,”nor a “pure attribution”—cf. Maydole (2005:127).)
Elsewhere, I have argued that there are many successful parodies of the
above argument, each having the following form:
A1*: A property is positive* only if its negation is not positive*.
A2*: Positive* properties entail only positive* properties.
A3*: The property of being God-like*—i.e. of possessing all the pos-
itive* properties—is positive*.
A4*: Positive* properties are necessarily positive*.
A5*: Necessary existence is a positive* property.
(Therefore, there exists a being whose essential properties are all
and only the positive* properties.)
Here’s the guiding idea. Start by granting, as Gödel supposes, that there is
a set P of positive properties. By hypothesis, P is closed under entailment
and necessitation. Hence, there is a set of properties P’—each of which is of
the form necessarily A, where A is not itself of the form necessarily B—that
entails P. (Why? Because the underlying modal logic is supposed to be S5,
which guarantees that necessarily necessarily A is in P if necessarily A is in P; and
because A4 guarantees that A belongs to P whenever necessarily A belongs to
P.) Suppose we order the members of P’, starting with the property of being
necessarily existent and the (impredicative) property of necessarily having all of
the properties in P. Go through the remaining properties in the order in
which they are listed, and, in each case, remove that property from the set
exactly if it is entailed by the remaining properties in the set. At the end of
this process, we shall have a set P’’ that (1) contains the property of being nec-
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essarily existent and the (impredicative) property of necessarily having all of the
properties in P, (2) entails P, and (3) is such that none of the properties—
except perhaps for the property of being necessarily existent and the (impred-
icative) property of necessarily having all of the properties in P—is entailed by
the rest of the properties in the set.
Suppose that P’’ is the set {being necessarily existent, necessarily having all of
the properties in P, S1, . . . , Sn}. Form the set P’’’ by removing some of the
members, other than the property of being necessarily existent and the prop-
erty of necessarily having all of the properties in P, from P’’. Suppose, then, that
P’’’ is the set {being necessarily existent, necessarily having all of the properties in
P, S’1, . . . , Sm}, where m<n. Let P* be the set that is formed by taking the
logical closure of the set {being necessarily existent, necessarily having all of the
properties in P*, S1*, . . . , S’n*}, where S’i* is obtained from S’i by replace-
ment of P with P*. The property of being God-like* just is the property of
having all of the properties in P*. 
Now, if it were reasonable to conclude from Gödel’s argument that
there is a God-like being—i.e. a being whose essential properties are just the
positive properties—then it would also be reasonable to conclude that each
different version of the parody argument establishes the existence of a dis-
tinct God-like* being—i.e. a being whose essential properties are just the
positive* properties. Of course, these beings are distinct because they differ
in their essential properties; and, of course, no one should believe in all of
these distinct “near-supreme” beings. (If we had allowed the initial formu-
lation of Maydole’s version of Gödel’s argument—in which a being is God-
like if and only if it possesses all and only the positive properties—then the
parody argument certainly would not succeed in establishing the existence
of a God-like* being that possesses all and only the positive* properties.
But, as noted above, there are good reasons for not allowing that formula-
tion of Gödel’s argument.)
Against the argument that I have just outlined, Maydole (2005:127)
makes the following objection:
Oppy effectively defines the positive* properties as those properties that
can be generated from the union of a certain proper subset of properties
that generate the positive properties with the unit set of the property of
being God-like.* The circularity here is vicious enough to make it particu-
larly difficult to understand just what properties Oppy has in mind when
he uses the terms “positive”* and “God-like.”*
To ward of one possible confusion, I should emphasize that there is no par-
ticular property that is denoted or expressed by the term “positive*” or the term
“God-like*”. What I have described is a recipe for producing parodies of
Gödel’s argument; and different particular properties are required for dif-
ferent applications of that recipe. If, then, Maydole has a serious objection
here, it must be to the idea that the recipe provides enough information to
ensure that there are properties of the kind that are required for the con-
struction of arguments that conform to the recipe. It may help to begin with
a simplified model, in order to try to fix some of the relevant considerations.
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Suppose, for the purposes of making a model, that, in a particular
application of the recipe, P’’ consists of just five properties: {being necessarily
existent, necessarily having all of the properties in P, being omniscient, being omnipo-
tent, being perfectly good}. It seems plausible to claim that the property of nec-
essarily having all of the properties in P is entailed jointly by the properties of
being necessarily existent, being omniscient, being omnipotent, and being perfectly
good. (Remember that, in Maydole’s system, necessarily coextensive proper-
ties are identified.) Consequently, it seems plausible to claim that the prop-
erty of necessarily having all of the properties in {being necessarily existent, being
omniscient, being omnipotent} will be a satisfactory candidate for the property
of necessarily being P*: P* will be (necessarily co-extensive with) the set of
properties obtained from the logical closure of the set: {being necessarily
existent, being necessarily omnipotent, being necessarily omniscient, neces-
sarily having all of the properties in the set {being necessarily existent,
being necessarily omniscient, being necessarily omnipotent}}, and the
property of being God-like* will be the property of having as essential prop-
erties exactly the properties that are in this set. In this application of the
model, the argument purports to establish the existence of a necessarily
existent, necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent but not necessarily
perfectly good being—hence, a being distinct from the one whose existence
is purportedly established by Gödel’s argument.
Maydole (2005:128) claims that Gödel’s argument is superior to my par-
odies because Gödel 
suggests a way to arguably ground his axioms on his intuitions and insights
. . . [whereas Oppy has no way to break] the circle with his own intuitions and
insights about what being positive* and being God-like* really mean.
Accordingly, [Oppy] does not have a way to arguably show that the axioms of
his Gödel* parody are true just in case those of Gödel’s argument are true.
I disagree with the first part of this claim. My “intuition and insight” is that,
if there really is a property of God-likeness that is picked out by Gödel’s
intuitions, then there will be a property of Godlikeness* that is just like God-
likeness except that perfect goodness (and everything that is bound up with
perfect goodness) is absent; and there will be another property of
Godlikeness* that is just like God-likeness except that omnipotence (and
everything that is bound up with omnipotence) is absent; and there will be
another property of Godlikeness* that is just like God-likeness except that
both omnipotence and perfect goodness (and everything that is bound up
with omnipotence and perfect goodness) is removed; and so on. So long as
we allow that, say, omnipotence and perfect goodness are logically inde-
pendent properties—i.e. so long as we allow that either could be possessed
without the other—then it seems to me to be intuitively obvious that there
are only technical difficulties that confront the description of a property that
is like God-likeness but for considerations to do with, say, perfect goodness.
I also object to the second part of Maydole’s claim. The point of the par-
ody is not—and cannot be—in any way dependent upon the claim that the
axioms of the parody are true just in case the axioms of Gödel’s argument
8
Oppy, G —Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument (Again)
12/17/2007  12:15 PM  (1st Proof)
8
are true. I don’t wish to deny the claim that, if there is a God-like being,
then it is highly unlikely—and perhaps even impossible—that there are also
God-like* beings. But the point of the parody is that there is good reason to
say that there is something wrong with Gödel’s argument. If we grant that
there is a property of God-likeness, then we should also grant that there are
properties of God-likeness*; but, if Gödel’s argument shows that there is a
God-like beings, then the parody arguments show that there are God-like*
beings. Since no-one should believe that there are God-like* beings, we con-
clude either that there is no property of God-likeness, or else that at least
one of the premises in Gödel’s argument is false. (Why might there be no
property of God-likeness? Because there is nothing that is picked out by the
expression “positive property”! Even setting aside worries that one might
have about the impredicativity of this property, the striking point is that nei-
ther Gödel nor anyone else has given a convincing account of what the pos-
itive properties might be. Except for the partial characterization that is pro-
vided by Gödel’s axioms, we are entirely in the dark, Maydole’s claims about
Gödel’s “intuitions and insights” notwithstanding.)
4.
The third of the issues that are raised in Maydole (2005) and that I wish to
take up here concerns the standing of the claim that it is impossible for
there to be a God-like being. As I noted in Oppy (2004), someone who
rejects the claim that it is possible for there to be a God-like* being can reject
the corresponding Gödel-parody that seeks to establish the existence of that
being. Those who accept that there is a God-like being will almost certainly
insist that it is not possible for any of the God-like* beings to exist; and I see
no reason for saying that they are unreasonable in so judging in the light of
their further judgment that there is a God-like being. But what of those who
do not accept that there is a God-like being? Maydole (2005:129) writes:
The committed non-theist refuses to believe that a supreme being is possi-
ble, and then infers that MPA is not sound. This is like putting the cart
before the horse. Since the premises of MPA logically imply that a supreme
being is possible, we should first determine the truth value of those
premises in a way that is epistemically independent of the proposition that
a supreme being is possible, and then commit or not to the truth of that
proposition. [In this passage, Maydole uses “MPA” to refer to his modal per-
fection argument. For the purposes of the subsequent discussion, I shall
pretend that that argument is not defeated by the considerations advanced
in Section 1 above. The general issues that Maydole raises also apply to
other cases in which parodies of ontological arguments are invoked to chal-
lenge arguments that rest of assumptions about possibilities that are
accepted only by believers; it is those general considerations that I am
interested in pursuing.]
Here it seems to me that Maydole is just mistaken. The “committed non-
theist”—say, John Mackie or Quentin Smith—has reasons for believing that
there is no supreme being. But, of course, by a simple inference, if there is
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no supreme being, that it is impossible for there to be a supreme being. So
there is no “putting the cart before the horse” on the part of “committed
non-theists”. Rather, the many reasons that the “committed non-theist” has
for saying that there is no supreme being are all reasons for the “committed
non-theist”  to say that it is impossible for there to be a supreme being.
Moreover, given that the “committed non-theist” has good reason to hold
that it is impossible for there to be a supreme being, the “committed non-
theist” has good reason to deny that arguments whose premises entail that
it is possible that there is a supreme being are sound. If I have good reason
for thinking that there is no supreme being, then I have good reason for
saying that there must be something wrong with, say, Gödel’s ontological
argument—and it is absurd to suppose that I must “set aside” these reasons
when I come to make that assessment. True enough, if I am sufficiently
astute, I will also be able to make further pronouncements about the valid-
ity of the argument, the truth of each of its premises, and the question of
whether the argument is somehow subtly question-begging; but there is no
reason at all to suppose that my rationality is somehow impugned if I am
not able to do any of this and yet remain a “committed non-theist”. (In ask-
ing that we “determine the truth value of those premises in a way that is
epistemically independent of the proposition that a supreme being is possi-
ble,”Maydole is asking that we set aside any reasons that we might have for
supposing that there is no supreme being; but it is absurd to advise people
to try to determine the truth of propositions by first setting aside consider-
ations that are relevant to the assessment of the truth of those propositions!)
Prior to making the remarks just commented upon, Maydole
(2005:129) engages in a “protracted analysis” that is meant to establish that
[W]hether or not the many parallels to MPA are sound is surely irrelevant
to the soundness of MPA itself, as well as to the reasonableness of either
accepting or refusing to accept that MPA is sound. What is relevant … is
whether or not it is reasonable to believe that a supreme being is possible.
The reference to the parallels is a red herring.
Here, again, it seems to me that Maydole is mistaken. I do not believe that
the soundness of the parallels to MPA is irrelevant to the soundness of MPA
itself. It is plausible to suppose that, if MPA is sound, then none of the par-
allels to MPA is sound; and it is plausible to suppose for at least some of the
parallels to MPA, that if they are sound, then MPA is not sound. (Could
there be more than one being that is necessarily omnipotent? Could there
be more than one necessarily existent being that is the sole originating cause
of the existence of all contingently existing things?) However, this is some-
thing of a side issue. The more important consideration, as I have already
noted, is that the point of the parallels is not to try to persuade the propo-
nent of MPA that MPA is unsound. Rather, the point of the parallels is to try
to persuade the proponent of MPA that MPA is unpersuasive, i.e. that MPA is
not capable of rationally persuading reasonable people who do not already
accept that there is a supreme being to change their views.
From the standpoint of the non-believer, the dialectical situation is as
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follows. The proponent of MPA supposes that there is a well-defined prop-
erty of Godlikeness, and that it is possible that this property is instantiated.
But, plausibly, if there is a well-defined property of Godlikeness, then there
are also many different well-defined Godlikeness* properties. However—
and this is the key point—there is no evident neutral reason to favor the
hypothesis that it is possible that there is a being that exemplifies Godlike-
ness over one or another of the hypotheses that it is possible that a being
exemplifies some kind of Godlikeness*. Even if we overlook the point that
these hypotheses conflict with one another, we have the best of reasons to
suppose that not all of these hypotheses are true: it is simply incredible to
suppose that these arguments could establish the existence of so many dif-
ferent near-perfect beings. Since there is no evident neutral reason to favor
some of these hypotheses over others, the reasonable course of action for
non-believers to take is to reject them all. Consequently—pace Maydole—
consideration of the many parallel arguments does make a contribution to
the case that MPA is not a persuasive argument.
5.
The final issue upon which I wish to comment concerns the standards for
assessment of alleged proofs of the existence of God. It seems to me that
Maydole takes the view that his MPA argument is a successful argument
unless opponents of the argument can convince him of the falsity of at least
one of the premises. In his concluding remarks, he emphasizes that he con-
tinues to believe that his argument is “arguably sound”. Moreover, against
my claim that his argument is plainly incapable of persuading reasonable
non-theists to change their mind on the question of the existence of a
supreme being, Maydole (2005:130) contents himself with the observation
that “persuading a committed non-theist . . . to change his or her mind,
even with reasonable persuasion, typically requires more than philosophy
and logic can provide”. And, Maydole (2005: 124) adds:
MPA has premises that themselves must be supported by reasoning, and it
is embedded in a strong modal logic that is hotly contested by some philoso-
phers, rightly or wrongly, because of its metalogical and metaphysical pre-
suppositions. But this is no cause for despair or reason to think that MPA is
a bad argument, anymore than it would be for most other substantive philo-
sophical arguments that equally rest on metalogical and metaphysical pre-
suppositions. In short, hardly anything in philosophy is ever settled.
I agree with Maydole that there are perennial philosophical disputes that
turn on deep differences, some metalogical, some metaphysical, and some
of other kinds. I agree, too, that it is implausible to suppose that there are,
within our reach, arguments that are capable of settling these perennial dis-
putes. Of course, we can—and do—produce arguments that decisively
refute one or another formulation of a given position in perennial disputes;
but showing that one formulation of, say, metaphysical dualism is logically
inconsistent, or massively improbable in the light of well-established science,
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or the like, creates no more than a minor ripple in the perennial dispute
about the nature of mind. While the most exciting progress in philosophy
comes when someone articulates a detailed formulation of a new position on
some of the perennial philosophical questions, we typically—and, in my
view, rightly—do not suppose that this kind of progress will ever bring
debate about those perennial questions to a close.
Now, given this view about the nature of perennial philosophical dis-
pute, what role should we see for the standard analytical philosophical tech-
nique of setting out an argument in standard form, with numbered
premises and identified inferential rules? While it is uncontroversial that
this technique has a place in the examination of the writings of other
philosophers—in order, for example, to facilitate the assessment of the
inferential moves that they make—it is an interesting question whether we
should expect to see much value in the setting out of one’s own arguments in
this way, except in cases where one supposes that one’s argument is utterly
decisive. In particular, one should surely be given to wonder what could be
the point of setting out an argument of your own with the conclusion, say,
that God exists, if the only recommendation that you have to make of that
argument is that it is “arguably sound”. Given the above view of the nature
of perennial philosophical dispute, what possible interest attaches to the
claim that a given argument of yours is “arguably sound,”i.e. is such that its
conclusion is supported by its premises, and is such that you—and others
who are of a like mind to you on the relevant perennial questions—accept
its premises? 
Given that—as I am prepared to allow—there are reasonable people
who reasonably believe that God exists, as well as reasonable people who
reasonably deny that God exists, it is bound to be the case that there are
valid arguments with the conclusion that God exists that have premises all
of which are accepted by some, or many, or most of those who believe that
God exists, but belief in whose falsity comes naturally and reasonably to
those who reasonably reject the conclusion that God exists. Moreover,
under the same concession, it is bound to be the case that there are invalid
arguments with the same conclusion that have premises all of which are
accepted by some, or many, or most of those who believe that God exists,
where it is an extraordinarily difficult matter to determine that those argu-
ments are invalid. Finally, under the same concession, it is bound to be the
case that there are valid arguments with the same conclusion that have one
or more premises belief in whose falsity is required—but in a way that is
utterly unobvious—by belief in the falsity of that conclusion (so that this
belief would come naturally and reasonably to those who reasonably do not
believe that God exists if only they had greater logical acumen). Given the
recognition that the question of the existence of God is one of the perennial
philosophical questions, I take it that it is quite clear that there is no genuine
intellectual interest that attaches to the activity of formulating arguments
that fall into any of the above categories. Unless you think that you’ve got
an argument for the existence of God that ought to persuade non-believers
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to change their minds on the question of God’s existence, you don’t really
have something that’s worth calling “an argument for the existence of God”.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that philosophy of religion is just about
the only area of philosophy where the activity of setting out one’s own self-
confessedly less-than-decisive arguments in standard form remains deeply
entrenched. (Certainly, in other areas of philosophy, one rarely encounters
this activity coupled with the move of claiming no more for one’s premises
than that they are consonant with one’s own intuitions.) When one thinks
about the major contributions to perennial philosophical debates in the past
fifty years—by philosophers such as Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Kripke, and
the like—one cannot help but be struck by the fact that they simply do not
engage in the activity of setting out their own arguments in standard form,
except in cases where they suppose that their arguments are utterly decisive.
At the very least, it seems to me to be fair to end with a challenge: if Maydole
thinks that there is some useful purpose that is served by his articulation of
modal perfection arguments, it is surely incumbent upon him to let us know
what that useful purpose might be. Merely saying that he does as others in
philosophy of religion do is not enough; for, if I’m right, standard practice
in philosophy of religion is simply indefensible.
At the beginning of his paper, Maydole (2005:123f.) makes some obser-
vations about the nature of philosophical argument:
A demonstration according to Aristotle is a sound argument with premises
that are undemonstrated and immediate, self-evident or intuitively obvi-
ous—and not thereby eligible for being disputed by rational agents. I doubt
that there are few if any interesting demonstrations in philosophy. Most
proofs for and against the existence of God, including the MPA, are not
demonstrations in this strong sense.. . . . But this no cause for despair or
reason to think that MPA is a bad argument, anymore than it would be for
most other substantive philosophical arguments that equally rest on meta-
logical and metaphysical presuppositions.
The clear implication of these remarks is to suggest that I am asking more
of arguments for the existence of God than it is reasonable to seek.
However, as the above observations in this section should make clear, my
complaint here is not that (a suitably modified version of) MPA fails to mea-
sure up to Aristotle’s standards of demonstration; rather, the basis of my
complaint here is the observation that it is utterly implausible to suppose that
MPA—or any of its ilk—could serve some useful purpose by way of its pre-
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